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The Value of Housing Attributes
Afundamental proposition of the analyses which we have presented in
this work is that the long-run equilibrium model employed implicitly or
explicitly in nearly all economic studies of urban housing markets
depicts housing outputs, housing production relationships, and the
nature of consumer demand in an analytically incorrect and misleading
way. As we have discussed in Chapter 2, the traditional model assumes
that households demand a homogeneous good which is produced com-
petitively in a market characterized by long-run equilibrium. The influ-
ence of this traditional model of the housing market is not confined to the
economics discipline. Many policymakers, often unknowingly, accept
the assumptions, conclusions, or policy prescriptions of such a model.
An essential element of the revised theory that underlies our
empirical analyses is that housing consumers demand not a homogene-
ous good "housing," but rather bundles of specific housing attributes. In
this chapter, we use statistical methods to estimate the market value of
individual housing attributes. These imputations, made by regression
analysis, are analytically equivalent to the market comparisons made by
individual demanders. The principal difference is that prospective buy-
ers will generally confine their detailed comparisons to a fairly limited
portion of the market, whereas we seek to describe the structure of
attribute prices for the entire housing market. Several earlier studies
have attempted to make similar statistical estimates of the contribution
of these specific attributes to the total price (rent or market value) of
residential services. For example, Ridker and Henning use census-tract
data for St. Louis to estimate the effect of variables such as air pollution,
accessibility to the downtown area, school quality, and substandard
conditions on the value of single-family homes.' Similar analy-
'G. Ridker and J. A. Henning, "The Determinants of Residential Property Values
with Special Reference to Air Pollution," ReviewofEconomics andStatistics 44,no. 2
(May 1967).
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ses,incorporating other variables, have been done by Muth, Oates and
Pendleton, and others.2
Most previous attempts to estimate the market value of specific
attributes of the bundle of residential services are deficient because they
fail to represent adequately the complexity of bundles of residential
services, because they lack adequate measures of residential quality, or
because they rely exclusively on aggregate data. In this chapter, we seek
to correct these deficiencies by using information for individual dwelling
units, by describing the bundles of residential services more completely
and, in particular, by making a serious attempt to measure physical and
environmental quality.
Quantitative estimates of the value of individual attributes of the
bundle of residential services are obtained by regressing market price
(value for owner-occupied dweffings and monthly rent for renter-occu-
pied dwellings) on several housing attributes. The coefficients for indi-
vidual variables then measure the market value of additional quantities
of each attribute. If the housing market could be assumed to be in long-
run equilibrium, this would be a fairly unambiguous measure, since it
would also be equal to the supply price of adding an increment of that
attribute to the bundles. However, because stocks are so important in
the housing market, we expect to find substantial departures from long-
run equilibrium for at least some attributes. For reasons outlined in
Chapter 2 and discussed further in this chapter, imputing values to
individual housing attributes is somewhat artificial. Each bundle earns a
composite quasi rent; it is these quasi rents that are imputed to specific
attributes.
2Richard F. Muth, Cities and Housing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969);
M. Stengel, "Racial Price Discrimination in the Urban Rental Housing Market" (Ph.D.
diss.,HarvardUniversity, 1970); R. N. S. Harris, G. S. Tolley, and C. Harrell, "The
Residence Site Choice,"Reviewof Economics and Statistics 50, no. 2 (May 1968): 325—34;
W. C. Pendleton, "The Value of Highway Accessibility" (Ph.D. diss., University of
Chicago, 1962); Benton F. Massell and Janice M. Stewart, "The Determinants of Residen-
tial Property Values" (Institute for Public Policy Analysis, Stanford University, Discussion
Paper No. 6, Oct. 1971); Thomas King and Peter Mieszkowski, "Racial Discrimina-
tion, Segregation, and the Price of Housing," Journal of Political Economy 81 (May/
June 1973): 590—606. John C. Musgrave, "The Measurement of Price Canges in Con-
struction," Journal of the American Statistical Association 64 (1969): 771—86; Wallace
E. Oates, "The Effects of Property Taxes and Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax
Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis,"Journal ofPolitical Economy 70, no. 6 (Nov.!
Dec. 1969): 957—71; John F. Kain and John M. Quigley, "Measuring the Value of Housing
Quality," Journal of the American StatisticalAssociation 70, no. 330 (June 1970): 532—48;
Mahion R. Straszheim, An Econometric Analysis of the Urban Housing Market (New
York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1975).192 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Even so, the imputed market value of specific housing attributes is
of considerable theoretical interest and is valuable for many kinds of
public and private decisions. For example, estimates of the market value
of residential quality obtained from earlier regressions for St. Louis were
used to obtain lower-bound estimates of the benefits of urban renewal
programs.3 Similarly, models of this kind would be extremely useful to
appraisers in estimating the market value of real estate for tax and
comparative purposes.
The coefficients may also be thought of as weights in a hedonic
price index.4 In the September 1969 issue of the Journal of the American
Statistical Association, John C. Musgrave describes Census Bureau
research aimed at the development of such an index for new single-
family homes.5 If measures of quality, such as those which we develop
for St. Louis dwelling units, could be obtained for other cities and
reproduced over time, it would be possible to develop similar indexes for
the housing stock.
Throughout this analysis we allow for possible distortions in the
housing market caused by racial discrimination and the existence of the
central-city ghetto. Indeed, one of the major objectives of the analysis is
to assess the distortions in housing prices and valuations attributable to
housing-market discrimination. As we shall discuss subsequently, there
is reason to suspect that racial discrimination distorts the housing prices
faced by black households, thus influencing consumption of residential
services by blacks. Accordingly, separate statistical models are esti-
mated for ghetto and nonghetto properties.
The representativeness of the underlying data is also affected by the
fact that the sample of dwelling units includes relatively few observa-
tions on suburban housing alternatives. Moreover, some information is
completely unavailable for the suburban observations in the sample. As
a result, separate estimates of the parameters of the models are made for
the city sample and for an expanded sample including suburban observa-
tions. Finally, because the price data for renter and owner-occupied
dwelling units are not comparable, separate. estimates are obtained for
3John F. Kain and John M. Quigley, "Evaluating the Quality of the Residential
Environment," Environment and Planning 2 (Jan. 1970): 23—32.
4Musgrave, "The Measurement of Price Changes": Martin J. Bailey, Richard F.
Muth, and Hugh 0. Nourse, "A Regression Method for Real Estate Price Index Construc-
tion," Journalof theAmerican Statistical Association 58 (1963): 933—42; Zvi (iriliches,
"Hedonic Price Indexes Revisited: Some Notes on the State of the Art," American
Statistical Association, Proceedings of theBusiness EconomicsandStatistics Section,
1967.
5Musgrave, "The Measurement of Price Changes."The Value of Housing Attributes 193
renter and owner submarkets. These stratifications by owner/renter,
ghetto/nonghetto, central city/metropolitan area are chosen to increase
the homogeneity of the samples employed. In this as in any other
econometric study, the accuracy of individual parameters depends both
upon the representativeness of the underlying data and upon the correct
specification of the statistical models.
With regard to the second issue, specification, the availability of
detailed information about the characteristics of dwelling units reduces
the likelihood of bias resulting from the omission of important explana-
tory variables. The use of individual dwelling-unit data should reduce the
problems of collinearity so often encountered in econometric investiga-
tion of urban housing markets and permit better estimates of individual
parameters. Nevertheless, such problems remain, because fully inde-
pendent variation in the underlying attributes of housing consumption is
not observed.
The specification of the appropriate functional form remains diffi-
cult. In particular, the joint purchase of housing attributes, the antici-
pated departures from long-run equilibrium, and the nonmarket produc-
tion of many housing attributes virtually insure a jointness in the
determination of attribute prices. Theoretical and empirical guidance on
what functional form to use for the value and rent equations is sparse.
We have dealt with this uncertainty by providing alternative estimates of
the rent and value equations for three common and easily interpreted
functions, linear (additive), semilog, and multiplicative (logarithmic).
This approach, though widely used in econometric research, is far
from satisfactory, since there are no clear-cut criteria for deciding which
of the various estimates is "best." Moreover, we have serious reserva-
tions about all of the functional forms used in the analysis. This dilemma
is not unprecedented in econometric research.
Previous researchers have used a variety of criteria to choose
among competing functional forms. The first, and most reputable, is to
derive the appropriate functional form from an underlying theoretical
model. For example, the semilog form may be chosen to insure diminish-
ing returns in the pricing of housing attributes. Unfortunately, the
theoretical model we have outlined, particularly as regards its dynamics,
remains too incomplete to provide any but the most general guidance. A
second commonly used method is to choose that functional form which
fits the data best. In some cases, researchers will have precedent on their
side as well, i.e., the fact that a particular functional form worked best in
one or more earlier studies. This method, though widely employed, has
serious conceptual and statistical weaknesses. We are saved from the
temptation of using the "goodness of fit" criterion, because in this, as in194 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
many other econometric studies using large numbers of explanatory
variables, none of the three specifications employed clearly dominates
by this standard.
Some functional forms may be preferred for statistical reasons. In
particular, several earlier rent and value studies have used the semilog
form of the model because of fears about heteroscedasticity if the
untransformed dependent variables were employed. Heteroscedasticity,
increasing variance of the dependent variable along some dimension,
typically size, may be a minor problem in our samples, but we do not
find it a compelling basis for preferring one equation form over another.
A particular functional form may be chosen simply because it is easy to
interpret. The popularity of additive, semilogarithmic, and logarithmic
models is due in no small part to the convenient interpretation of
individual coefficients.
All three of these specifications are employed for the rent and value
equations presented in this chapter. Finally, to permit a fuller interaction
between dwelling-unit size and the remaining attributes of the housing
bundles in the determination of prices, we stratify the nonghetto renter
and owner properties by number of rooms and estimate separate regres-
sions for each size unit.
All coefficients of the additive value equations are divided by one
hundred so that they may function as rental equivalents. This is, of
course, analogous to the convention used in Chapter 7. As before, the
correctness of this procedure depends on the appropriateness of the
gross rent multiplier used. In fact, the rent and value equations obtained
in this chapter can be used to estimate some rent/value equivalents. This
is accomplished by solving the additive renter equation using mean
values of the explanatory variables for owners and by solving the owner
equation using means for renters. When mean attributes of owner-
occupied units are used in the additive renter equation, a multiplier of
132 is obtained; solving the owner equation with renter means yields a
multiplier of 185. In spite of this finding, we continue to use a multiplier
of 100 to enable the reader to convert the coefficients to value terms
more easily.
No adjustments are needed for the semilog and log-log models,
since the coefficients of both have convenient interpretations that do not
depend upon the level of the explanatory variables. As noted in Chapter
7, coefficients of the semilogarithmic equations show the percentage
change in the dependent variable that would result from a one-unit
change in one of the explanatory variables; the coefficients of the log-log
models, which are constant elasticities, show the percentage change in
the dependent variable resulting from a 1 percent change in an explana-
tory variable.The Value of Housing Attributes 195
THEMEASURES OF HOUSING ATTRIBUTES
Table8-1 presents a summary of the information on housing attri—
butes, market prices, and tenancy terms used in the housing-valuation
models. The means and standard deviations of the variables are shown
separately for the complete sample, which includes 26 rental units and
136 owner-occupied units in the suburbs (Table 9-i).
Theexplanatory variables used in the attribute-price models are
grouped into five categories of conceptually similar attributes. The first
category, dwelling-unit quality, comprises five variables that measure
various aspects of quality and amenity of the sample dwelling unit and
structure.6 Interior quality, the first of the five, is the mean of seven
individual measures of dwelling-unit condition and quality—the condi-
tion of floors, windows, walls, levels of housekeeping, and the like—
obtained in the Home Interview Survey (see Appendix A, second page).
Exterior quality, the second index, is a measure of the condition of the
exterior of the structure in which the sample dwelling unit is located. For
single detached units, a fairly close correspondence might be expected
between these measures of exterior and interior quality. The correspon-
dence would be less for multifamily units, even though there is a
tendency for better-quality apartments to be located in better-quality
structures. The index of exterior quality that we employ is constructed
from several individual measures of structure quality and condition in a
manner analogous to the construction of the index of interior quality.
The underlying variables used to construct the exterior quality index
were collected by building inspectors as part of the Physical Blight
Parcel Survey, whereas the variables used in constructing interior qual-
ity were obtained in the Home Interview Survey. Thus, exterior quality
not only measures a different dimension of quality, but it provides an
independent opinion about the quality of the dwelling unit. Since both
measures must depend on interviewer judgments, we hope that these
independent measurements of closely related attributes have served to
reduce enumeration error. On the average, sample owner-occupied units
are higher in both interior and exterior quality, have hot water and
central heating more often, and are newer than rental units (Table 8-1).
Unit size is measured by four variables: the logarithm of the number
of rooms, the number of baths, first-floor area, and parcel area. First-
61n Appendix F we present alternative models using somewhat different measures of
the quality of dweHing units, structures, parcels and neighborhoods. The derived measures
in the appendix rely upon aggregation of some 39 independent measures of the quality of
aspects of the housing bundle by the method of principal components (factor analysis).196 HOUSINGMARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
TABLE8-1
Means and Standard Deviations of Housing Attributes for Renter and
Single-Family Owner-Occupied Units in the City
Renters Owners
Standard Standard
Variables MeanDeviation Mean Deviation
Dwelling quality
Interior 3.80 .68 4.15 .54
Exterior 2.42 .64 2.85 .43
Hot water .90 S •97
Central heating .67 — .93
Age 59.80 21.12 50.78 20.55
Size
Rooms (logarithm) 1.28 .33 1.68 .34
Baths 1.01 .26 1.20 .68
First-floor area (00's sq. ft.) — — 9.47 2.72
Parcel area (000's sq. ft.) 1.94 1.56 4.72 3.58
Neighborhood characteristics
Adjacent units 2.81 .80 3.32 .66
Block face 2.87 .85 3.39 .75
Median schooling 8.93 .88 9.26 .82
Proportion white .53 .46 .71 .43
Miles from CBD 3.18 1.51 4.56 1.44
School quality 7.88 .56 8.19 .62












No major appliances .83
Owner in building .19 — — —
Yearsof occupancy 5.74 10.29 15.49 12.90
Race of occupant .47 — .26 —
Rent(value) $61.34 $25.41 $14,596 $6,722
NOTE: A flat is a rental unit located in one of the old, small multifamily structures
common in St. Louis, as distinct from an apartment, which is a rental unit located in a
large apartment structure.The Value of Housing Attributes 197
floor area,7 a surrogate for total area, is not a meaningful measure of unit
size for multifamily structures. Inasmuch as single-family units do not
have a uniform number of floors, some measurement error exists even
for these units.
From Table 8-1, it is evident that owner-occupied single detached
units are not only of better quality than renter units but are also larger.
Owner-occupied units have an average of about 5.4 rooms, as contrasted
with 3.6 rooms for rental units; they have an average of 1.2 baths as
compared to an average of 1 bath for rental units; and their parcel areas
(lot size in square feet divided by number of dwelling units) average
nearly five-thousand square feet, as contrasted with about two-thousand
square feet for rental units.
The category "neighborhood characteristics" includes a diverse
collection of variables which describe the condition of adjacent and
nearby properties, socioeconomic characteristics of the neighborhood,
quality of some critical public services, and accessibility to the CBD.
The first two neighborhood characteristics, quality of adjacent units and
quality of the block face, were obtained from the Physical Blight Parcel
and Environmental Block Face surveys. In the Physical Blight Parcel
Survey, teams of building inspectors provided detailed evaluation of the
condition of properties on each side of the sample property, as well as of
the exterior—structure and parcel—of the sample property. The quality-
of-adjacent-structures variable is the simple average of the overall evalu-
ations of the condition of the properties on each side of the sample unit
(items 32 and 27 of the Physical Blight Parcel Survey). In the Environ-
mental Block Face Survey, the second member of the two-man building
inspector teams made detailed observations about the characteristics
and condition of the block face for sampled units and provided an overall
or combined block-face rating. This overall rating of the block face has a
minimum value of 1 ("Bad—major degree of structural deficiencies in
maintenance, landscaping, accumulation of trash or adverse influ-
ences") and a maximum value of 5 ("Excellent—no deficiencies—
evidence of considerable spending"). Data describing adjacent units and
the block face were collected to measure the effect of neighboring
dwelling units on the value of sample units.
The median-schooling and the proportion-white variables measure
the racial and socioeconomic composition of the neighborhood. The
neighborhood, in both cases, is defined as the census tract in which the
unit is located. Median schooling is the median number of years of
formal schooling completed by adult residents of the census tract in
1960. The proportion white is also defined for census tracts, but it is the
7This measure was obtained from assessors' records for the structure.198 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
estimated proportion white in 1967. Preliminary analyses employed the
census-tract proportion white in 1960 from the Census of Population to
measure the racial composition of the neighborhood.8 Subsequent analy-
ses suggested that the rapid expansion of the ghetto between 1960 and
1967 produced major changes in boundaries of the ghetto between 1960
and the time of the survey. Therefore, we determined to use the sample
of St. Louis households to estimate the 1967 proportion white by census
tract.
Miles from the CBD, shown in Table 8-1, was but one of several
accessibility measures evaluated in the analysis. Several other accessi-
bility indexes were obtained from the East-West Gateway Coordinating
Council; and one of them, the accessibility of each dwelling unit to
employment, was used in rent and value equations similar to those
shown in Table• 8-2. These were computed from origin and destination
data obtained in the 1967 St. Louis travel survey. All of these accessibil-
ity indexes are highly correlated with one another and with distance from
the CBD. Rent and value equations were estimated using employment
accessibility and distance from the CBD with essentially similar results.
Because it is so much easier to interpret, distance from the CI3D rather
than the accessibility indexes is reported in these analyses.
The last two neighborhood characteristics, school quality and
crime, are intended as measures of the quality of neighborhood services.
These and other local public goods are featured prominently in public
goods—residential location models.9 Moreover, opinion surveys and
public commentary have evidenced widespread concern regarding
neighborhood schools and safe streets among urban residents.
The public-goods dimensions of the bundle of residential services
present special problems for the analyst. There are few neighborhood
measures of these services and little theoretical or empirical guidance
about how such measures should be constructed. An important concep-
tual issue, for example, is whether to measure public service inputs or
outputs, presuming that the latter can be defined. Wherever possible, we
collected and evaluated both input and output data. Howev,er, output
measures—achievement scores for neighborhood public elementary
schools and the number of major crimes reported per Pauly block—are
used in the rent and valUe equations. As has been discussed in Chapter
8Kain and Quigley, "Value of Housing Quality."
9Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political
Economy 64, no. 3 (Oct. 1956): 416—24; Bryan Ellickson, "Jurisdictional Fragmentation
and Residential Choice," The American Economic Review 61, no.. 2 (May 1971): 334—39;
Oates, "The Effects of Property Taxes"; Jerome Rothenberg, "Strategic Interaction and
Resource Allocation in Metropolitan Intergovernmental Relations," American Economic
Review 59, no. 2 (May 1969):The Value of Housing Attributes 199
4, we assume that in choosing a residential bundle, households are more
concerned with public-goods outputs (number of serious crimes in the
vicinity, school test scores their children may receive) than with their
production process or their inputs (number of policemen or teachers). Of
course, as taxpayers, they may be concerned about the cost (taxes) of
living in each community.'0
Output and input measures were obtained for both private and
parochial elementary schools within the city, and these measures were
coded to the dwethng units served by each school in the city. Output was
measured by three achievement-test scores for eighth-grade pupils—
reading, literary-writing, and math. All three scores are highly cone-
lated; the eighth-grade math achievement score is used to measure
school quality in these analyses. The input measures obtained were
student-teacher ratios, student-classroom ratios, the percentage of stu-
dents and teachers that were nonwhite, the age of the school, and a
measure of the condition of the physical plant. Similar data were
obtained for both public and parochial schools. However, public and
private school achievement scores were highly correlated, and prelimi-
nary analyses led us to omit the measures of parochial school quality
from the rent and value equations.
•It was not possible to obtain at reasonable cost input measures of
police protection for each neighborhood. Thus, only output measures—
the number of major crimes and the number of minor crimes per Pauly
block—were used in the analysis. These were coded to each sample
dwelling unit.
Unfortunately, comparable neighborhood-services data are not
available for units located outside the city. Many explanations of central-
city decline and of the movement.of middle- and upper-income families
to the suburbs have emphasized the role of the better schools and the
lower level of criminal activity to be found there. Obviously, we would
have liked to be able to evaluate the importance of these considerations.
toOates makes an attempt to measure these countervailing influences on the desirabil-
ityofspecific locations by regressing property values on expenditures per pupil (an input
measure of school quality), effective tax rates, and several other determinants of property
value, using census data for fifty-three municipalities in New Jersey. His results indicate
that local property values bear a significant negative relationship to the effective tax rate
and a significant positive correlation with expenditure per pupil in the public schools. He
concludes that "the size of the coefficients suggests that for an increase in property taxes
unaccompanied by an increase in the output of local public services the bulk of the rise in
taxes will be capitalized in the form of reduced property values. On the other hand, if a
community increases its tax rates and employs the receipts to improve its school system,
the coefficients indicate that the increased benefits from the expenditure side of the budget
will roughly offset (or perhaps even more than offset) the depressive effect of the higher tax
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The desirability of extending the analyses of the metropolitan housing
market to this broader and more critical set of questions cannot be
overemphasized.
Structure type constitutes the fourth category. The owner-occupant
sample includes only single-family units. Single detached units comprise
only 10 percent of the city renter sample (Table 8-1). Flats and apart-
ments are the most common type of rental units occupied by sample
households; 43 and 27 percent, respectively, of all city renters reside in
these types of structures. A flat is a rental unit located in one of the old,
small multifamily structures common in St. Louis, as distinct from an
apartment, which is a rental unit located in a large apartment structure.
The housing attributes included in the final category pertain only to
renters and describe aspects of the contractual agreement between the
landlord and the tenant. The first four attributes indicate whether the
rental contract includes the provision of various utilities and furnishings
by the landlord. For example, 73 percent of tenants had to pay their own
heating bills, 18 percent had to pay their own water bills, 91 percent of
the units were unfumished, and 83 percent did not include major appli-
ances (refrigerator and/or stove).
CITYEQUATIONS
Thevariables included in price-determination equations for city
owners and renters shown in Table 8-2 are generall.y similar, but they are
not identical. For both owners and renters, the models include seven
neighborhood characteristics, the number of rooms, the number of
baths, parcel area, and three of the five unit-quality variables. In addi-
tion, the renter equation includes dummy variables for hot water and
central heating, which are excluded from the owner equation, since
practically all owner-occupied units include these amenities. Similarly,
the owner equation includes first-floor area, which is omitted from the
renter equation because it refers to the structure rather than to the
dwelling unit.
Finally, the renter equation includes six dummy variables for struc-
ture type and six measures of tenancy terms. A seventh structure type is
incorporated in the intercept. The first four tenancy-term variables
correct the dependent variable, contract rent, for the utilities provided
by different landlords. The "owner in building" dummy variable is
designed to test the hypothesis that resident landlords accept lower rents
to exercise greater control over tenant selection.
Duration of occupancy, though shown for owners in Table 8-1, isThe Value of Housing Attributes 203
not included in the value equations. In the rent equation it provides an
estimate of the discounts given to long-term tenants. Landlords are
sensitive to turnover because both vacancies and redecorating are
expensive. Therefore, it is rational for landlords to share some of the
savings from lower expenses with long-term tenants in the form of
discounts. The years-of-occupancy variable, which assumes that dis-
counts are proportional to duration of tenure, is, of course, only one of
several ways in which this hypothesis might be represented.
Race of occupant is shown in Table 8-1 but is not included in either
the renter or owner equations. We hypothesize that housing-market
discrimination operates by limiting black housing search and residence
to certain well-prescribed neighborhoods. For reasons discussed in
Chapter 2, prices in these neighborhoods may differ from those prevail-
ing outside the ghetto. However, we hypothesize that whites and blacks
pay the same prices within these neighborhoods.hi
Table 8-2 shows the estimated coefficients for the 567 rental units
and the 267 owner-occupied single-family homes in the city for the
linear, semilog, and log-log specifications. In the semilog models, the
dependent variable, rent or market value, is expressed in logarithmic
form. In the log-log models, the following variables are also expressed as
logarithms: interior and exterior quality, age, parcel area, first-floor area,
quality of adjacent units and block face, median schooling, miles from
the CBD, school quality and crimes. There is very little difference
among the six equations in terms of overall goodness of fit; all six explain
a very large proportion of the variation in the dependent variables. If the
number of statistically significant coefficients (t ratios significant at the
.05 level) is used as the criterion, there is, again, little basis for preferring
one equation over another, although, by this standard, the semilog
equation for owners and the semilog and log-log equations for renters are
slightly better. Since neither the semilog nor the log-log specification
shows a clear superiority, our discussion of the results emphasizes the
linear form because of its simpler interpretation.
Despite some important differences,the parameter estimates
obtained for the five unit-quality variables are generally consistent
among equations, generally conforming to a priori expectations. The
least consistent results are obtained for the exterior-quality variable,
which has a negative sign in all three owner equations. Its coefficient is,
11Becauseof the intense segregationin U.S. cities, the practical difference may be
small. For a study thatuses raceofthe occupantratherthana neighborhood variable, i.e.,
ghetto,see Kingand Mieszkowski, "Estimate of Racial Discrimination," and our discus-
sion in Chapter 3.204 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
however, smaller than its standard error in every case. The negative sign
may be due to multicollinearity; for single detached units, interior and
exterior quality may simply be too highly correlated.
Except for the unanticipated negative sign obtained for exterior
quality in the owner equations, the coefficients in Table 8-2 indicate that
households pay substantially more for higher-quality units. For example,
the linear equation for renters indicates that they will pay about $1.31 per
month for an additional unit of interior quality, $4.77 per month for an
additional unit of exterior quality, $3.09 per month for hot water, $4.44
per month for central heating, and $.29 per month for an additional year
of newness.
The semilog and log-log models suggest even higher valuations of
hot water and central heating. Coefficients of the semilog model suggest
that units with hot water and central heating rent for 25 percent and 13
percent more, respectively, than otherwise comparable units. It is likely
that these variables act as more general measures of dwelling-unit
quality, and that the estimates reflect this.
Central heating and hot water are not included in the owner models,
and as noted previously, the coefficient of exterior quality is smaller than
its standard error. However, the coefficient of interior quality, which is
significant at the .10 level, indicates that owners will pay $8.18 per month
($818 in value) for an additional unit of interior quality. Newness is even
more valuable in the owner than in the renter submarket; owners will
pay $1.00 ($100 in value) for a year of newness as compared wit!1 an
outlay of only $.29 by renters. The average owner-occupied structure in
the city sample is fifty years old; thus, the results in Table 8-2 indicate
that a new unit would sell for $5,000 more than an otherwise comparable
unit of average age.
The size variables are generally highly significant and have the
correct sign. The coefficient of number of rooms, expressed in loga-
rithms in all six equations, indicates in the additive equation for renters
that a prospective renter would have to pay about $9.18 more per month
for a three-room unit than for a comparable two-room unit, but only an
additional $11.56 to obtain a five-room unit rather than one consisting of
three rooms. A similar progression exists for owner-occupied units; a
six-room unit costs about $1,007 more than a comparable three-room
unit, but an eight-room unit costs only $418 more than one consisting of
six rooms. In comparing the rooms coefficients of the renter and owner
equations, it is essential to remember that the owner equation includes
first-floor area, particularly since it is hard to imagine adding a room
without increasing the floor area. If an added room measured only ten
feet by ten feet, it would add $634 to the value of the unit through the
floor-area coefficient. The semilog models indicate that rents increase byThe Value of Housing Attributes 205
37 percent with each additional room, while the value of single-family
houses increases by 26 percent with each additional room, floor-area
being held constant.
Neighborhood characteristics include several measures of residen-
tial quality that are external to the sampled property. All share the
distinctive feature that the owners of individual properties cannot by
themselves change their level. Instead, such changes require the aggre-
gation of individual location and investment decisions, government
action, or both. Yet these external factors strongly influence the location
decisions of individual households and the market valuation of individual
properties. Most previous studies of urban housing markets have been
based on aggregate data such as census-tract statistics, or on national
probability samples, which lack information on neighborhood character-
istics. As a consequence, few of these studies have considered the
influence of the quality of nearby properties on property values, on
housing consumption, and on the quality of an individual property. The
estimates in Table 8-2 provide some indication of the relative importance
of these aspects of residential quality.
It is apparent from Table 8-2 that the condition of adjacent and
nearby properties has a substantial effect on the market value of sample
properties. Variables which describe the physical condition of adjacent
and nearby properties appear to have nearly as large an influence on the
value of sample properties as the interior- and exterior-condition varia-
bles. For example, in the renter additive equation, the sum of the
coefficients of adjacent and block-face variables is $5.57 per month,
whereas the sum of the coefficients of the interior- and exterior-quality
variables is $6.08. The condition of adjacent properties and the block
face appears to have an even larger effect on the value of owner-
occupied single detached properties. The sum of the coefficients of the
adjacent and block-face variables in the additive equation is $11.96, as
compared with only $3.55 for the interior- and exterior-quality variables.
Because of the serious collinearity between the interior- and exterior-
quality indexes for single detached units, this comparison may be some-
what misleading. When exterior quality is omitted from the additive
value equation for the entire sample, the coefficient of interior quality
increases to $12.41, while the coefficients of block and adjacent quality
become $6.05 and $4.70, respectively.
In addition to these measures of the condition of nearby dwelling
units, the surrogate for neighborhood prestige (median schooling of
residents of the census tract) is positive and larger than its standard error
in all six equations, differing from zero at the 1 percent level in all but
one. The additive models indicate that a rental unit located in a census
tract where the median adult has only completed the eighth grade will206 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
rent for $5.90lessper month than an otherwise identical rental unit
located in a census tract where the median adult has completed the tenth
grade. If the unit in question is owner-occupied, it will have a market
value $2,982 less than a comparable unit in a tract with a median
educational level two years greater. The largest neighborhood-prestige
effects are obtained for the multiplicative model; a 1 percent change in
median schooling produced a change in house values of about 1 percent
and a change in rents of almost 1/2 percent.
The results obtained for the school-quality and crime variables are
only suggestive of the importance of these public services. The coeffi-
cient of the neighborhood crime index is smaller than its standard error
in all of the equations and has the wrong sign in two of the six. The
results for the coefficient of school quality are somewhat better. These
have the correct signs and are larger than their standard errors in all six
equations. Taken at face value, the results of the additive model indicate
that renters are willing to pay $2.76 more per month for units served by
neighborhood schools where students average one year better in
achievement. The semilog and log-log specifications suggest somewhat
larger effects. From the frequent references to school quality and crime
in discussions of how households make residential choices and of how
the urban housing market operates, stronger school and crime effects
might have been anticipated.12
For a number of reasons, however, part of the influence of better
schools on value may be represented by dwelling-unit and neighbor-
hood-quality variables. There is reason to believe that there is consider-
able error in the school-quality measurement. As a result, since mean
school achievement is highly correlated with the indexes of residential
quality, the residential variables may be proxying the effects of school
quality.13 Moreover, if better schools attract households with higher
incomes, which spend more on housing maintenance, part of these
measured effects of dwelling-unit and neighborhood quality are logically
indistinguishable from school quality.
Even more acute problems are encountered in attempting to mea-
sure neighborhood public safety. Inclusion of a neighborhood crime
index in the model is more a statement of good intentions than a serious
effort to confront the conceptual and measurement problems of quanti-
fying the perceived safety of a neighborhood. The index of neighborhood
t2Oates, "Effects of Property Taxes."
'3For a discussion of this problem see Eric A. Hanushek andJohnF. Kain, "On the
Value of Educational Opportunity as a Guide to Public Policy" in OnEqualityof Educa-
tional Opportunity, Frederick Mosteller and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds. (New York: Ran-
dom House, 1972).The Value of Housing Attributes 207
crime used in the analysis is also highly correlated with the indexes of
residential quality.
A final reason for anticipating weak school and crime effects is the
absence of suburban properties. The largest variation in school quality
and level of criminal activity is found not within the city of St. Louis but
rather between the city and its suburbs.
Theories of urban spatial structure place considerable emphasis on
accessibility to the center as a determinant of housing value. The results
in Table 8-2 provide very weak evidence of an accessibility gradient. In
only two of the six equations in Table 8-2 does the coefficient of distance
from the CBD exceed its standard error, and it is negative in all but one
equation. There are several, not necessarily inconsistent explanations
for the relatively poor performance of the accessibility variable. The
most reasonable is that the relationship between accessibility and rent
and value is more complex than can be embodied in any of the simple
functional forms included in Table 8-2. In particular, as we have indi-
cated in Chapter 2, the location rent surfaces for various attributes, or
bundles of attributes, probably vary. Moreover, the estimates in Table 8-
2 are heavily influenced by ghetto properties, and we made the point in
Chapter 3 that accessibility considerations play only a minor role in
determining the market value of such properties. Subsequent analyses
will provide support for both of these contentions.
Of the variables specific to the renter model, all but two of the
structure-type dummies and all but one of the tenancy-terms variables
are significant at the .05 level in the additive model. All structure-type
dummies in the semilog equations, and all but the rooming-house
dummy in the log-log equations, are significant at the .05 level. Of the
tenancy-terms variables, only the "no water" and "no furniture" vari-
ables fail to pass this test. The regression coefficients for the duration-
of-occupancy variable are small—a monthly rent discount of only $.25
for each year of occupancy in the additive model and .4 percent per year
discount in the semilog and log-log models—but they are highly signifi-
cant. These small differences presumably capture a lagged adjustment
of monthly rent. Landlords are less likely to raise rents when their
properties are occupied by stable tenants than when there is a change in
Occupancy.
A different landlord-tenant interaction may be responsible for the
relatively large coefficient of the owner-in-building variable. The addi-
tive model suggests that this discount amounts to $4.37permonth, while
in the semilog model it amounts to about 7 percent of monthly rent and in
the log-log model to about 6 percent. The lower rents for units with
resident landlords may result from less sophistication and professional-
ism on the part of these smaller operators, or they may reflect different208 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
tenant-selection policies. When the owner lives on the property, he may
select tenants more carefully to achieve lower vacancy rates and lower
maintenance and repair costs. The critical impact of these factors on the
profitability of rental properties has been emphasized in other studies.'4
The findings also suggest that standardized dwelling units located
inside the ghetto are somewhat more expensive than those outside, a
conclusion which is consistent with Ridker and Henning's study of St.
Louis and with other investigations of housing-market discrimination.'5
The coefficient of proportion white is negative in all six equations.
However, its level of significance is exceedingly low in the regression for
owner-occupied housing. For renters, in the additive equation, t =1.743;
in the semilog, t =1.127;and in the log-log, t =1.649.Taken at face
value, the coefficients in the linear model indicate that a comparable
renter unit costs 6.3 percent more in an "all-black" area than in an "all-
white" area. The estimated differences from the semilog and log-log
models are 3.8 percent and 5.7 percent respectively. For owner-occu-
pied units, the three models imply that comparable units cost 1.0 percent
(from the linear form), 3.8 percent (from the semilog form) or 4.2 percent
(from the log-log form) more in an "all-black" than in an "all-white"
area of the central city.
Although the negative signs for the proportion-white variables in
Table 8-2 are consistent with the findings of discrimination markups in
most earlier studies of housing-market discrimination, serious questions
may be raised about the specifications used for both the owner and rental
models.16 If housing-market discrimination exists, it is doubtful that its
effects can be represented by a uniform percentage markup on all types
of housing. The phenomenon is undoubtedly far more complex—with
the effects of discrimination more or less strongly evident in various
submarkets defined by quality and structure type. It should also be
remembered that the equations in Table 8-2 are estimated for city
dwelling units only. Yet, it is clear that for most households—particu-
larly, white households—the relevant housing market is the entire met-
ropolitan area. In the following section, the small suburban sample is
added, and the effect of racial discrimination on housing prices is
considered more fully.
14Muth, Cities and Housing; George Stemlieb, The Tenement Landlord (New
Brunswick, N.J.: The Urban Studies Center, Rutgers, 1966).
'5Muth, Cities and Housing; King and Mieszkowski, "An Estimate of Racial Dis-
crimination"; Stengel, "Price Discrimination"; Chester Rapkin, "Price Discrimination
Against Negroes in Rental Housing Market" in Essays in Urban Land Economics (Los
Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); David H. Karlen, "Racial
Integration and Property Values in Chicago" (Urban Economics Report No. 7, University
of Chicago, April 1968); Ridker and Henning, "Determinants of Residential Property
Values."
16See citations in note 15.The Value of Housing Attributes 209
THEVALUE OF HOUSING ATTRIBUTES INSIDE AND
OUTSIDE THE GHETTO
InChapter 3 we asserted that the most useful analytical way of
representing the effects of racial discrimination in urban housing markets
is to postulate the existence of two relatively independent submarkets:
the ghetto and the remainder of the metropolitan area. These two
markets are interrelated in a variety of ways, but there are significant
barriers between them. The ghetto and nonghetto housing markets are
organized by different institutions and have different information net-
works. Housing prices in the two markets must bear a relation to each
other, but this relationship need not be uniform for different types of
housing. The two submarkets differ in terms of the composition of their
housing stocks, the sources of the supply, and the extent and composi-
tion of demand.
Blacks limit their search for housing—or are restricted by discrimi-
natory practices and lack of information—to a few geographically con-
tiguous neighborhoods that are designated by custom and practice for
black occupancy. Whites are free to live anywhere in the metropolitan
area, but for a variety of reasons (i.e., prejudice, an unwillingness to be
the only whites in the neighborhood, or the existence of better or
cheaper housing outside the ghetto) they generally reside beyond the
confines of the ghetto.
The rent and value equations presented in Table 8-2 tend to corrob-
orate earlier studies that have suggested the presence of a discrimina-
tion markup. Our estimates and those obtained in earlier studies assume
that the structure of relative prices for the various housing attributes is
the same for properties located inside and outside the ghetto, i.e., that
the samples of ghetto and nonghetto properties are homogeneous. This
assumption of homogeneity is, however, inconsistent with the position
that the ghetto and nonghetto housing markets are separate. Aitnough
substantial differences in the prices of comparable ghetto and nonghetto
properties at the boundaries of the ghetto are unlikely to persist for long
periods of time, prices in the interior of the ghetto may differ substan-
tially from prices in the interior of the white housing market. Unfortu-
nately, our sample is not extensive enough to test all hypotheses about
the structure of housing-attribute prices inside and outside the ghetto.
Nonetheless, some crude tests of sample homogeneity between ghetto
and nonghetto properties are possible.
Shown in Table 8-3 are three separate regression estimates of the
market value of housing attributes for owner- and renter-occupied prop-
erties, depending on whether they are located inside or outside the
ghetto. The estimates in Table 8-3 aI.l employ an additive specification;
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8-4. The first and fourth equations in both tables present estimates of the
market value of individual housing attributes for properties located in the
ghetto. For these analyses, the ghetto is defined as consisting of all
census tracts that were at least 85 percent black in 1967. The second and
fifth equations in Tables 8-3 and 8-4 provide estimates of the market
value of housing attributes for central-city renter- and owner-occupied
properties located outside the ghetto, i.e., for central-city properties
located in census tracts more than 85 percent white in 1967. The third
and sixth equations provide estimates for all nonghetto properties,
including an additional 26 renter-occupied and 136 owner-occupied prop-
erties in St. Louis County. Addition of these suburban properties signifi-
cantly increases the sample size, particularly for owner-occupied single
detached units. More important, it makes the nonghetto sample much
more representative of the nonghetto housing market in the St. Louis
metropolitan area. High-value properties and the best neighborhoods are
still underrepresented in the sample, but the effects of adding these
suburban units to the sample are large. With 136 additional suburban
properties, the mean value of single-family detached units increases by
over $2,000, from $15,309 for the city nonghetto sample to $17,456 for
the entire nonghetto sample.
Except for the omission of the school and crime variables from the
entire nonghetto sample, the equations estimated for the two nonghetto
samples are identical. It is evident from Tables 8-3 and 8-4 that the
estimated attribute prices for ghetto and nonghetto properties are very
different. For example, the linear equation suggests that city nonghetto
renters pay an estimated $6.73 per month for an increment of interior
condition; when suburban renter properties are added, an even higher
estimate—$6.99 per month—is obtained. For rental properties in the
ghetto,. the coefficient of interior condition is negative— —$.48 per
month—although smaller than its standard error. Similarly, an addi-
tional unit of exterior condition has an estimated value of only $2.68 in
the ghetto as compared with an estimated value of $6.75 for central-city
nonghetto properties, and $5.39 for the combined nonghetto sample. The
premium paid for central heating in the ghetto is, however, quite large:
$7.76 for the ghetto compared with $1.41 for the city nonghetto sample,
and $.06 for the entire nonghetto sample.
In contrast, most types of neighborhood quality appear to be more
expensive inside the ghetto than outside. The sum of the adjacent-unit
and block-face condition variables is $6.92 per month for ghetto rental
units, as compared with only $3.16 for central-city nonghetto rental
units, and $4.14 for all nonghetto rental units. The coefficient of median
schooling is $3.61 for the ghetto, $4.17 for the city nonghetto, and $2.68
for the entire nonghetto. The coefficient of school quality is ten times asThe Value of Housing Attributes 213
TABLE 8-4
Semilog Specifications of Rent and Value Equations for Ghetto and Nonghetto
Units




4t ratio greater than 1.0.
Renters Qwners
Nonghetto Nonghetto
Variables Ghetto City All GhettoCity All
Dwelling quality
Interior —.003 .0722 .0631 .106'
Exterior .022 •Ø454 .084 .021 .028
Hot water .2 13' .491' .482'
Central heating .153' .088' .093'
— .002'— .005' — .0051— .007'— .0081— .0061
Size
Rooms •357' .410' .421' .277' •3991
Baths .1051 .1352 .020 .059'
Floor area .029' .038' .034'
Parcel area — .002 .002 .019' .000
Neighborhood
Adjacent units •Ø374
Block face •Ø791 .013 .024 .021 .020 .0412
Median schooling .126' .063' .006
Miles from CBD —.002—.006 .020' .011 — — .022'
School quality .006 •Ø552 .022
Crime .000 — .000 — .000 — .000
Structure type
Single detached .1172 •Ø974
Duplex .068 .2551 .262'
Row house .041 ..056
Apartment .154' .038 .058
Flat .129'
Rooming house .1961—.540' — .500'
Tenancy terms
No heat — .137'—.161' —.142'
No water —.011 —.033 —.017
No furniture — — —.133'
No appliances —.
Owner in building —.105'—.091'
Years of occupancy — .0041— .005' — .004'
Constant 2.671'2.675' 3.032'7.91517.890'8.67'
R2 .741 .771 .795 .690 .744 .748214 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
large for the city nonghetto as for the ghetto. For rental properties,
additional rooms, larger parcels, and additional baths all appear more
expensive in the ghetto than outside.
Similar results are obtained for the owner models. 'The combined
interior- and exterior-condition coefficients are larger for nonghetto than
for ghetto properties. When exterior quality is omitted from the entire
nonghetto value equation, the monthly cost of interior quality becomes
$11.58 as compared with $10.99 for each unit of block quality and $3.52
for each unit of adjacent-unit quality. By comparison, although few of
the neighborhood quality variables are statistically significant, their
coefficients are uniformly larger for ghetto than for nonghetto properties.
The sole exception is school quality, which has a negative coefficient in
the ghetto equation. In the city nonghetto model, the coefficient of
school quality, which is significant at the .10 level, indicates that St.
Louis homeowners are willing to pay nearly a thousand dollars more for
a dwelling located in a neighborhood served by public schools that
average one grade better on standardized achievement tests.
The results obtained for the size variables in the ghetto regressions
are bizarre. The coefficient of the logarithm of the number of rooms in
the additive model is actually negative, although smaller than its stan-
dard error. In the semilog model, it is positive with a t ratio of 1.4 and a
value of .16. This coefficient is only about half as large as that obtained in
the city nonghetto equation, .28. Similarly, the other principal size
measure, first-floor area, has a value of .04 in the nonghetto equation, as
contrasted with a value of .03 in the ghetto semilog equation.
We believe that the inconsistent results for the ghetto rent and value
models result from the limited range of some housing attributes available
there. For example, since ghetto schools are almost uniformly bad, it is
not surprising that the coefficient of school quality is small, often incor-
rect in sign, and always smaller than its standard error in the ghetto value
and rent equations. We suspect many of the differences in attribute
prices for ghetto and nonghetto properties are explained by supply
limitations of this kind.
Analyses in subsequent chapters will indicate that some combina-
tion of price discrimination, the unavailability of certain types of housing
in the ghetto, and real or imagined limitations on the ability of black
households to locate outside the ghetto distort black housing patterns.
Even so, it is instructive to ask what the average black household would
have to pay in order to obtain its current housing bundle outside the
ghetto. Rent would be $49.37 versus $55.90, and the average owner-
occupied unit could be purchased for $835 less ($12,319 versus $13,154).
In general, omitting ghetto properties from the sample seems to
improve the parameter estimates obtained in the value and rent equa-The Value of Housing Attributes 215
tions,bringing them into closer correspondence with our a priori expec-
tations about the structure of housing prices. One exception is provided
by the distance-from-the-CBD variable. For the additive owner equa-
tions, the coefficient of distance from the CBD is smaller than its
standard error but negative for all three samples. In the additive renter
models, however, the coefficient of distance from the CBD is negative
and significant at the 5 percent level for the ghetto. It is negative but
smaller than its standard error for city nonghetto properties, while being
positive and significant at the 1 percent level in the full nonghetto
sample. This reversal with the addition of the relatively few suburban
observations may reflect unmeasured higher quality in much suburban
rental housing or an actual inversion of the location-rent gradient for
rental units. Such an inversion of the usual rent gradient could reflect an
equilibrium excess supply of some types of rental units at central
locations or a temporary excess demand for certain types of rental units
at some suburban locations. The same reversal is evident in the semilog
equations; for all nonghetto properties the price of rental housing
increases as distance from the CBD increases. Neither the owner nor
renter semilog equations provide evidence that the price of ghetto
properties declines with distance from the CBD.
This question is only slightly different from that addressed in the
analysis of Table 8-2, where it was estimated that the average rental
property in the sample costs 4 to 6 percent more in an "all-black" than in
an "all-white" area. However, we now acknowledge possible differ-
ences in the structure of relative prices in the ghetto and in the nonghetto
housing markets.
Estimates of the cost of purchasing the average ghetto owner and
renter properties outside the ghetto are obtained by solving the non-
ghetto rent and value equations using the_average characteristics of
ghetto properties. Conversely, estimates of the costs of purchasing the
average nonghetto property inside the ghetto are obtained by solving the
ghetto equations using the average characteristics of nonghetto pro-
perties.
Table 8-5 summarizes these calculations, in terms of percentage
differences, for the stratified models for both owner and renter proper-
ties. For example, the average monthly rent of ghetto units in the sample
is $55.90. Using the linear equation for nonghetto properties in the city
(Table 8-3, column 2), the monthly rent of a dwelling unit with these
same characteristics is estimated to be $50.09; thus the estimated
markup on ghetto properties is 11.6 percent. For the same comparison,
the coefficients of the semilog model (Table 8-4, column 2) provide an
estimated markup of 17.8 percent for a property with the average
characteristics of ghetto rental units, i.e., this property is 17.8 percent216 HOUSINGMARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
TABLE8-5




Average ghetto housing bundle
In city nonghetto 11.6 17.8 19.1
In entire sample nonghetto 13.7 9.2 10.0
Average city nonghetto housing
bundle
In city ghetto 12.5 1.3 2.1
Average nonghetto housing
bundle (entire sample)
In city ghetto 6.9 2.5 1.6
Owner bundles:
Average ghetto housing bundle
In city nonghetto 5.2 5.1 6.1
In entire sample nonghetto 0.8 0.8 3.2
Average city nonghetto bundle .
In city ghetto 1.7 3.3 8.2
Average nonghetto sample
(entire sample)
In city ghetto 19.2 30.2 51.4
more expensive in the ghetto than in the rest of the central city. Using a
log-log specification (not shown in Tables .8-3 and 8-4), the percentage
difference is estimated to be 19.1 percent.
When the estimates are computed using the coefficients from the
entire nonghetto sample, we are, of course, unable to include the value
of schools and crimes in the comparisons. Using the entire nonghetto
sample, the estimates of ghetto markups are slightly lower, in the range
of 9 to 14 percent.
The monthly rent of the average city nonghetto property is $68.09.
Using the coefficients of the linear equation for ghetto properties (Table
8-3, column 1), the estimated rent in the ghetto for a dwelling unit with
these characteristics is $76.63; thus the estimated markup is 12.5 per-
cent. The estimated markups using the coefficients of the semilog and
log-log models are much smaller.
The fourth line of Table 8-5 presents the estimated markups based
on the characteristics of the average nonghetto rental property in the
entire sample. Again, because information on the incidence of crime andThe Value of Housing Attributes 217
the quality of schools is unavailable outside of the central city, we are
unable to include these important attributes in the comparisons.
The latter part of the table presents the estimated ghetto markups
for owner-occupied properties.
For several reasons, we have more confidence in the estimates of
ghetto markups presented in lines 1 and 5ofTable 8-5. These calcula-
tions are based on the regressions estimated for, the city nonghetto
properties; thus, they include differences in the value of the schools and
the neighborhood crimes associated With each unit. The regression
results estimated for nonghetto properties also appear to have fewer
problems with collinearity, since there is substantially more variation in
the independent variables.
This analysis suggests that the ghetto markup for rental properties
may be on the order of 12 percent, and for owner-occupied properties it
may be on the order of 5 percent.
The table, however, provides estimates for rental properties ranging
between 1 and 19 percent; for owner-occupied properties, the estimates
range between 1 and 51 percent. It is worth noting that in none of these
comparisons is a comparable property estimated to be cheaper in the
ghetto housing market than in the nonghetto market.
STRATIFICATIONBY DWELLING-UNIT SIZE
Aswe mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, we are not fully
satisfied with the functional forms used in the regression estimates. We
doubt that any of them adequately represents the kinds ofjointness and
interdependence in attribute prices that characterize urban housing mar-
kets. In many respects, additive specification is the least satisfactory. It
assumes that the price of each attribute is independent, and that the
value of the complete bundle is the simple sum of the prices of the
individual attributes, weighted by the quantities of each. This implies
that households pay a certain amount for each room regardless of its
condition or quality, a certain amount for dwelling-unit quality regard-
less of the dwelling-unit size, and a fixed dollar amount for quantities of
each neighborhood characteristic.
These strong additivity assumptions might be tenable if there were
no jointness in the production of the various attributes, if all housing
markets were in long-run equilibrium, and if all attributes were produced
in competitive markets. Unfortunately, in practice, none of these condi-
tions is satisfied. Many attributes have a clear jointness in production,
many others are not provided by competitive firms, and we anticipate
rather large departures from long-run equilibrium. As a result of these218 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
factors, there may be large spatial quasi rents on individual attributes or
on particular bundles of attributes. The independence assumption is
particularly offensive in the case of variables measuring dwelling-unit
size and quality, since there are technological reasons for expecting the
cost of producing dwelling-unit quality to depend on the size of the
dwelling unit.
The semilogarithmic and logarithmic specifications are more plausi-
ble than the additive model in this respect, since, in both, the payment
for a particular attribute depends on the levels of the remaining attri-
butes. For example, in the semilogarithmic model, the payment for a
unit of a particular attribute is assumed to be proportional to the level of
the remaining attributes. Thus, in the example cited previously, the
market value of dwelling-unit quality depends on the size of the dwelling
unit; in fact, it is proportional to the base cost. An increase in dwelling-
unit quality by one unit increases the cost of the dwelling unit by X
percent. If housing bundles included only dwelling-unit size and quality
variables, the semilog form of the equation might be a reasonably
satisfactory representation. However, there islittle justification for
requiring that payments for neighborhood quality be proportional to
payments for dwelling-unit size and quality, and even less justification
for requiring the payment for dwelling-unit quality to be dependent on
the level of neighborhood quality. The logarithmic form of the model
embodies a similar, but even stronger, interaction among the payments
for individual attributes.
The semilog and log-log forms have the desirable property of allow-
ing some interactions among the payments for individual attributes. But
the permitted interactions are of a highly specific nature; and in one way
or another, each fails to correspond to our prior expectations about the
structure of attribute prices. For this reason, we now present an alterna-
tive specification of the rent and value models that allows a fuller
interaction between dwelling-unit size and the several measures of qual-
ity. To estimate these alternative models, we stratify the renter and
owner samples by the number of rooms and obtain separate additive
equations for each size of dwelling unit. This procedure allows the
payment for each of the remaining attributes to vary with dwelling-unit
size. However, unlike the semilog and multiplicative forms of the pooled
equations, these payments need not vary uniformly with changes in size.
The advantages obtained from stratifying the' equations by number
of rooms should not obscure the fact that there are also disadvantages to
this procedure. The most obvious is the substantial reduction in sample
size. The largest sample, five-room owner-occupied units, includes only
125 observations and several samples have less than 50observations.The Value of Housing Attributes 219
Still another serious consequence of stratification is a reduction in the
variance of both the dependent and explanatory variables. These reduc-
tions in sample variance create a number of statistical difficulties. Due to
collinearity among variables and reduced variance in many variables in
the stratified samples, it is not possible to obtain meaningful coefficient
estimates for many of the variables that were statistically significant in
the pooled model. To obtain estimates for the subsamples based on the
number of rooms, it was necessary to prune the value and rent equations
substantially by omitting obviously nonsignificant variables and those
too highly correlated with other included ones.
The reduction in sample variance is exacerbated by yet another
problem. As the data in Tables 8-6 and 8-7 illustrate, virtually all of the
remaining housing attributes are systematically related to the number of
rooms in the dwelling-unit. Moreover, for each size category, units in the
ghetto are systematically inferior in both dwelling-unit and neighborhood
quality to units located outside the ghetto. The positive relationship
between size and quality is quite regular for three-, fou•r-, and five-room
rental units, and for four-, five-, six-, and seven-room owner units. The
largest and smallest rental units, however, conform less well to this
pattern, possibly because the sample sizes are quite small. An important
consequence of the association between dwelling-unit size and other
housing attributes is that part of the effects on price of both omitted and
included housing attributes may be reflected in the intercepts of the
stratified equations.
As we have previously noted, the more serious problems of multi-
collinearity and smaller sample sizes of the stratified regressions made it
necessary to omit a number of explanatory variables from these equa-
tions. This was accomplished by excluding explanatory variables with
small standard deviations and those with very low tratios in trial
regressions. However, three variables of particular theoretical interest—
miles from the CBD, neighborhood prestige, and percent white—were
retained until the last iteration. This procedure produced the similar, but
still nonuniform equations, shown in Table 8-8. Although equations were
obtained for the entire sample, for the ghetto sample, and for the non-
ghetto, only the equations for nonghetto properties for the owner cate-
gories and for three out of five of the renter categories are shown in
Table 8-8.
Owing to the lack of uniformity among the equations in Table 8-8, it
is hard to generalize about them. Still, some interesting patterns are
evident. Because of the strong interest that has centered on accessibility
in analyses of the housing market, all of the equations in Table 8-8














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.224 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
for the three rental equations in Table 8-8 are inconsistent with the price
relationships predicted by monocentric theories of urban spatial struc-
ture but generally confirm the results obtained for the nonghetto rental
equations in Tables 8-3 and 8-4. For the stratified nonghetto rental
equations, two of the three distance coefficients are positive, but only
one, that for four-room apartments, is greater than its standard error.
This coefficient is quite large, however, and is significant at the .01 level.
The average four-room nonghetto unit in the sample is located 4.4 miles
from the CBD, and the sample standard deviation is 2.7 miles. Thus, a
unit one standard deviation closer to the center (1.7 miles from the CBD)
would rent for $22.30 less than an otherwise comparable four-room unit
one standard deviation toward the periphery (7.1 miles from the CBD).
In contrast to the results for rental units, the coefficients of the
variable of distance from the central business district in the owner
equations provide rather consistent evidence of declining location rents
with distance from the CBD. The coefficient of miles from the CBD is
negative for all room size categories and varies in magnitude from a low
of $3.01 per mile per month to $6.44 per mile per month ($301 and $644
per mile in value). The pooled owner equation for all nonghetto proper-
ties also has a negative coefficient, but it is smaller than its standard
error and is only about one-fifth as large as the smallest estimate of a
gradient obtained for individual room equations. This suggests that there
are different value gradients for the different size structures, a result that
is consistent with Straszheim's findings for San Francisco.17 As a result,
pooling these units of different size produces a misspecification that
obscures the presence of any gradient. The gradients for five- and six-
room units are quite similar. Interestingly enough, it is evident from
Table 8-7 that the average five-room unit has as much floor area as the
average six-room unit. Both, however, have more square footage than
four-room units and are smaller than either seven-room units or eight-
to twelve-room units.
The other interesting result shown in Table 8-9 is the very different
pattern of significant coefficients for the neighborhood and dwelling-unit
quality variables in the renter equations. None of the neighborhood
quality variables consistently affects the rent of four- and five-room
units. However, both interior and exterior dwelling quality have large
and statistically significant coefficients in the three-room equation, and
the coefficient of exterior quality is large and statistically significant in
the four-room equation. By contrast, nearly opposite results are
obtained for five-room units. Of the five measures of dwelling-unit
quality, only structure age is larger than its standard error in the five-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.226 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
and median schooling are significant at the 1 percent level and quite
large. These results suggest further that the markets for small and large
multifamily units are quite distinct; a different configuration of attri-
butes command market prices for larger multifamily units than for
smaller multifamily units.
In spite of this and other evidence of heterogeneity in the structure
of prices for rental and owner units of different sizes, equations including
an identical set of explanatory variables for unit-size categories are
shown in Table 8-9.
The rental equations include two dwelling-unit quality variables,
exterior quality and age; one measure of neighborhood quality, block
quality; and three contract-rent corrections. The owner equations
include two measures of dwelling-unit quality, interior quality and struc-
ture age; first-floor area; the quality of adjacent units; and distance from
the CBD. Although equations for the largest and smallest rental units are
included in Table 8-9, not much confidence can be placed in them
because of the small sample sizes (only nine properties for one- and two-
room rental units and seventeen properties for six- to eight-room units).
The identical form of the equation reported in Table 8-9 facilitates
comparisons among the equations for different room size classes. Nearly
all of the coefficients in the stratified equations have the anticipated
signs, though many of the coefficients are not statistically significant.
The few sign reversals that do occur are for very small samples, the
largest and smallest rental units; and, therefore, do not represent impor-
tant exceptions. Age of structure appears in both the rental and owner
equations and is highly significant statistically in nearly all equations. In
the rental sample, the age coefficient varies from forty-four cents per
month for each year of age for three-room units to over a dollar per
month for six- to eight-room units. There is no clear progression by unit
size, suggesting important deviations from long-run equilibrium. In the
owner equation, the age coefficient varies from a low of $.93 per month
for each year of age for six-room units to a high of $7.49 per month for
each year for the largest owner-occupied units. The latter figure cannot
be considered very reliable since it is based on only thirty observations
and is smaller than its standard error. Except for this estimate for the
largest units, all of the newness premiums for age vary within a narrow
range. If it can be assumed that age measures a uniform dimension of
quality for the various size units, this result is somewhat inconsistent
with the view that the St. Louis housing market is in long-run equilib-
rium. Except for the eight- to twelve-room equation, the age coefficients
for the stratified owner equations are of approximately the same magni-
tude as are obtained for the comparable pooled equation in Table 8-3; the
premiums for newness for the stratified rental equations in Table 8-9,The Value of Housing Attributes 227
however, are generally larger than those obtained in the comparable
pooled equations in Table 8-3.
The coefficients of both exterior quality and block quality in the
stratified renter equations vary substantially in terms of both statistical
significance and magnitude, and no simple pattern is evident by room
size. However, the tendency observed in Table 8-8 for dwelling quality
to be a more important determinant of value for smaller units and for
neighborhood quality to be a more important determinant of value for
five-room units is supported by the estimates in Table 8-9.
Except for the largest owner units, the coefficients of interior
quality vary within a fairly narrow range. Again, as with structure age,
there is no noticeable tendency for the premium for dwelling-unit quality
to increase with room size. This may result from errors of measurement
of the dwelling-unit quality variable, from misspecification, or from
differences in the structure of house values for units of different size.
Resolution of this important question must await further research with
improved measurements and larger, more representative, samples. Simi-
larly, the premium for adjacent-unit quality is quite different among units
of different size and fails to exhibit an obvious regularity by size.
The stratification by room size is designed to standardize the sample
properties by dwelling-unit size; however, it is evident that the proper-
ties included in each of the room size classifications are not actually
homogeneous in terms of size. The inclusion of first-floor area in the
owner equations then provides a measure of this variation in dwelling-
unit size within room size categories. The significant variation in first-
floor area for units of the same room size is clearly evident from the
relatively large standard deviations of first-floor area within room size
categories. The standard deviation of first-floor area which, not sur-
prisingly, increases with the number of rooms, is 226 square feet for the
smallest units and 642 square feet for the largest, with a marked increase
between six and seven rooms. Evidently, then, there is considerable
overlap in dwelling-unit size as measured by floor area among the room
size categories. For example, the average first-floor area of five- and six-
room units is nearly the same— 1,047 square feet and 1,080 square feet,
respectively. Since the standard deviations of first-floor area for five- and
six-room units are 231 square feet and 354 square feet, it is obvious that
many five-room units are larger than many six-room units when mea-
sured by first-floor area.
The coefficients of the floor-area variable in the owner equations are
all statistically significant at the 1 percent level and vary widely from one
room size to another. The most similar estimates are obtained for five-
and six-room units, which may be quite close substitutes. Both smaller
units—four-room—and larger ones—seven-room and from eight- to228 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
twelve-room—are considerably more expensive per square foot of addi-
tional floor area. These differences in unit cost per square foot may
either be evidence of different quasi rents on units of uniform quality
within a room size class, or may reflect some of the previously men-
tioned differences in dwelling unit and neighborhood quality among the
room size classes. Further research is needed to obtain more definitive
answers to these questions.
The explanatory power of the individual equations in Table 8-8 is
less in many cases than that of the comparable pooled equation in Table
8-3. However, the more interactive specification of the rent and value
equations shown in Table 8-9 provides a marginally better explanation of
the variation in rents and values than the single equation in Table 8-3.
When the variance due to the stratification by room size is added to the
variance explained by the independent variables included in each equa-
tion in Table 8-9, the overall explained variance is .798 for renters and
.795forowners.
SUMMARY
Housingchoices, both as to type and location, reflect decisions by
urban households to purchase a wide variety of heterogeneous attri-
butes, including both quantitative and qualitative aspects of dwelling
units, structures, neighborhoods, and public services. This chapter has
provided a detailed analysis of the market prices of these housing
attributes.
Based upon detailed information gathered for each dwelling unit, we
have analyzed the market prices of bundles of housing services defined
to include both quantitative attributes of the units themselves and quali-
tative features of the structure, the parcel, and the immediate neighbor-
hood. The results suggest that, for both owner-occupied and rental units,
variations in the level of these attributes are systematically related to
market prices. Besides attributes that measure dwelling-unit size (num-
ber of rooms, baths, parcel area, first-floor area), the quality of dwelling
units, of parcels, and of the block face, and neighborhood prestige are all
reflected in housing prices. It is worth emphasizing that many of the
attributes of a heterogeneous housing stock, for example structure type
and lot size in built-up areas, are extremely durable and are expensive to
modify. Other attributes, for example, heighborhood ôharacteristics, are
not supplied by firms at all.
The analysis of attribute prices also considers, in a limited way, the
influence of good schools and safe neighborhoods upon housing valuesThe Value of Housing Attributes 229
and rents. The results indicate that even within the central city, dwelling
units served by better schools command higher prices.
The results of our analyses for both renter and owner-occupied
properties indicate that structures of attribute prices differ between
properties located in the ghetto and those located outside of it. In part,
these differences reflect the limited choice of housing attributes available
in the ghetto housing market. For example, the premium for better
quality neighborhood schools is estimated to be about $4.85 (per month
for an additional year of achievement on standardized tests) outside the
ghetto. This premium is not observed for ghetto properties, largely
because the schools servicing these properties are uniformly bad.
When the sample of nonghetto properties is expanded to include the
important suburban alternatives facing white households, the rent and
value equations explain more of the variation in housing prices. The
analysis of the combined city-suburban sample is limited, however, by
the absence of any information regarding suburban public services.
For the pooled sample of ghetto and nonghetto properties, the
results suggest that similar units cost 4 to 6 percent more in an all-black
than in an all-white neighborhood. For the comparisons between sub-
markets, the results suggest that a rental unit with the characteristics of
the average ghetto unit would rent for 12 to 19 percent more in the ghetto
than in the nonghetto portion of the housing market; for owner-occupied
units, the discrimination markup is estimated to be 5 to 6 percent. For
example, from the linear model, a representative rental unit in the ghetto
costs about $70 a year ($5.80 a month) more than in the unrestricted
(nonghetto) portion of the city housing stock. A representative owner-
occupied unit in the ghetto would cost $651 less outside.
The analysis concludes by estimating value and rent relationships
for nonghetto properties separately for units of varying size (as mea-
sured by numbers of rooms). Despite the reduction in the variation of
housing attributes when the sample is stratified, the results indicate that
there are important interaction effects between payments for size and
other housing attributes. For example, the premium for newness appears
to vary with dwelling-unit size, though the relationship is a complex one.
In addition, the employment-accessibility variable used in the anal-
ysis (miles from CBD) is more often significantly different from zero in
the stratified models for owners than in the pooled models. One implica-
tion is that simple monocentric analyses, which ignore the existence of
residential capital, fail to take into account some important tradeoffs
which are considered by households in choosing a residential location,
and which are reflected in market prices. Moreover, employment acces-
sibility is systematically related to other important housing attributes,230 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
which themselves vary spatially. More detailed analyses of the accessi-
bility measures, using both miles from CBD and more generalized
gravity-model measures of accessibility to employment or retail activity,
indicate that the interaction of accessibility and the spatial distribution of
existing hoqsing attributes deserves more attention in analyses of urban
spatial structure.